Right in front of us all we can see how President Trump is preparing to upend this fall’s midterm election and take over our democracy. Jonathan Winer writes an excellent analytic and descriptive piece that should be read and then widely distributed to all citizens. Time for everyone to play Paul Revere 2.0 and warn all Americans. T

The Washington Spectator

Emergency Planning: The President Is Preparing to Challenge 2026 Midterms. The Country Can Still Act to Protect Them.

Each president since Eisenhower has prepared secret Emergency Authorities intended for use under extreme circumstances, such as a nuclear attack or domestic upheaval. These unlimited powers have never been invoked.

by Jonathan M. Winer

Apr 29, 2026 | Politics

National polling currently places President Trump’s approval rating at 40 percent or lower. Most models and prediction markets expect the 2026 congressional elections to shift control of the House, and more narrowly, the Senate, to the Democrats. That outcome would trigger investigations, subpoenas, and likely impeachment proceedings directed at members of the administration.

This would not be a happy outcome for a president who refused to accept the outcome of the 2020 election, incited the January 6, 2021 insurrection to shut down Congressional certification of the electoral count, spent years advancing claims of election fraud and irregularities ever since, and continues to attack the results of elections he doesn’t like as “rigged.”

Since returning to office, Trump has directed federal agents to seize 2020 election ballots and related materials from Fulton County, Georgia. His Department of Justice has subpoenaed records tied to the Arizona Senate’s review of Maricopa County voting. He has also issued executive orders addressing election-related conduct and election administration.

A March 2025 order directed federal action to require documentary proof of citizenship for voter registration, use federal databases to review voter eligibility, reshape voting-system standards, cut off federal funds to noncompliant states, and enforce a rule barring states from counting mail ballots received after Election Day.

A March 2026 order went further. It directed the Department of Homeland Security and the Social Security Administration to compile state-by-state citizenship lists before federal elections. It instructed Trump’s Department of Justice to prioritize investigations and prosecutions of officials and private actors involved in issuing or distributing ballots to ineligible voters. And it ordered new Postal Service rules for tracking mail and absentee ballots, and authorizing agencies to use funding pressure against noncompliant states and localities.

These efforts are increasingly being recognized as unlawful attempts to overturn the will of the voters, And already, organizations focused on protecting people’s right to vote have filed cases to test the legitimacy and constitutionality of the President’s orders in court.

Although the President continues to insist the 2020 election was rigged and riddled with fraud, the purpose of these orders is not merely to recast that election as stolen and establish the appearance that he in fact prevailed. The orders are intended to use federal power to shape the terms of future elections by restricting mail voting, conditioning ballot validity on Election Day receipt, and asserting new federal control over voter eligibility and election administration prior to the midterms. At the same time, the use of federal agents and subpoenas to obtain ballots and voting records is not routine enforcement. It is a step toward normalizing federal involvement in the custody and review of election-related materials and outcomes.

Taken together, these measures are formulated to ensure that control of Congress does not change hands, and that the conditions for a future electoral loss are narrowed or eliminated. They set the stage for the President to override an electoral defeat by using federal investigative, enforcement, and emergency authorities, and to reduce elections to a formality—held, but no longer determinative—and consistent with the President’s own statement that once the system is “fixed,” voters “won’t have to vote anymore.”

Secret Emergency Authorities and Their Potential Deployment

But beyond President Trump’s existing attacks on voting lies an additional and potentially more dangerous layer of presidential power—the secret emergency authorities embodied in Presidential Emergency Action Documents, or PEADs.

Since President Eisenhower’s time, every administration has maintained a set of secret, pre-drafted PEADs for use in crises involving foreign attack or large-scale domestic upheaval. These are not policy proposals. They are directives, written in advance, that can be signed and implemented immediately across the federal government.

These authorities remain classified and have been developed for use in extreme scenarios, such as a catastrophic attack that threatens the government’s ability to function. To date, the PEADs have never been used. No President has found an emergency dire enough to justify invoking them. But they provide a standing mechanism that a President could activate to override legal constraints, detain individuals, and direct federal agencies to act without prior judicial review.

The PEADS Scenario in Response to a Republican Defeat in 2026

Here’s how President Trump could use the PEADs process if he faces results in the November 2026 congressional election that would give the Democrats a majority in the House or Senate, or both.

The scenario would likely begin by Trump declaring that the election results were rigged, as he has in the past. He could identify specific jurisdictions—counties, cities, or states—and assert that their results should not be recognized. He could point to claims of fraud and irregularities, illegal ballots, or foreign interference, including cyber activity, as the basis for that claim.

In response, compliant federal authorities would require investigation of those results before they were finalized. The authorities would move to secure ballots, voting records, or related materials in contested jurisdictions, building on the actions the Trump administration has already taken.

While these investigations are taking place, the President could then call on congressional leadership to proceed as if the announced results are invalid, urging the Speaker of the House to organize the chamber on the basis of a Republican majority, and encouraging similar action in the Senate, urging them to ignore any jurisdictions in which the federal government was still undertaking its review.

While any such action would be immediately litigated at that point, the President’s actions would be very likely to provoke a response from the voters themselves. People would take to the streets. They would protest what they understand to be the nullification of a legitimate election. Demonstrations would spread across major cities. Organized groups would coordinate marches, strikes, and shutdowns. Labor organizations, civic groups, and political networks would mobilize. The scale would quickly become national.

The President would likely respond with the kind of language he has already used to describe his political opponents, such as the “enemy within,” domestic adversaries he has previously said should be targeted by the U.S. military. This assertion would be consistent with his existing direction to his administration to treat “organized political violence” and “domestic terrorism” as priority threats and to identify, investigate, prosecute, and disrupt “to the maximum extent permitted by law” not only individuals, but organizers, funders, and supporting networks.

He could apply that framework to the protests. He could direct the Attorney General to treat coordinated demonstrations as organized political violence. He could instruct the FBI and Joint Terrorism Task Forces to identify organizers, map funding sources, and examine any connections—real or alleged—to foreign actors. He could direct the Internal Revenue Service to examine nonprofit organizations supporting protests and refer cases for enforcement.

Federal agents would then make arrests. They would arrest individuals at protests, whether or not violence has occurred. They would arrest organizers identified through communications and financial records. Prosecutors would bring conspiracy charges and seek pretrial detention, including on theories of coordinated activity rather than specific acts of violence. The threshold for those actions would be defined by how the government characterizes the activity, not by the presence of violence in any conventional sense.

These actions would be taken under existing federal criminal, national security, and emergency authorities. But these actions would be unlikely to resolve that kind of election crisis.

If protests expand and continue, if major cities see sustained disruption and strikes take hold, the President could declare that the situation threatens the functioning of government and constitutes a national emergency. This escalation would bring us to his use of the PEADs.

The Power of Presidential Emergency Action Documents

The President has already described his authority as essentially boundless, asserting expansive authorities to combat a wide range of domestic emergencies, ranging from immigration to tariffs to elections processes. He has pointed to “very strong emergency powers” and said he has “the right to do a lot of things that people don’t even know about.” He has stated that these powers extend beyond what is publicly understood, and beyond ordinary limits. His governing assumption is that his authority as president is not subject to constraint by other institutions, rules, or regulations—including, in his own words, even by the Constitution itself.

Although the contents of current PEADs remain classified, declassified materials from earlier periods make their structure clear. They have included authority to detain individuals deemed dangerous, restrict movement, seize property, and take control of communications systems.

Once the President invokes the PEADs directives, federal agencies shift from ordinary legal processes to immediate execution of emergency orders. As soon as the President signs such orders, federal agencies act.

The specific agencies responsible for implementing any detention directives are not publicly known. Historically, such plans have involved the Department of Justice and federal law enforcement. In the current system, however, the largest existing detention infrastructure is operated by the Department of Homeland Security, particularly Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which maintains a large paramilitary force and a nationwide network of facilities that can be expanded through existing contracts and emergency authorities.

Immigration enforcement already provides precedent. Investigative reporting has identified more than 170 cases during 2025 in which U.S. citizens were unlawfully detained by federal immigration agents, who have no authority over them, sometimes for days and without prompt access to counsel. Those cases show how quickly detention can occur and how slowly legal status may be resolved once it does.

The Department of Justice would align prosecutions with those directives. The FBI would identify and apprehend individuals classified as organizers, coordinators, or participants in what the administration defines as organized unlawful efforts to interfere with legitimate government processes. That would be the same framework used in January 6 prosecutions, where hundreds of defendants were charged with obstructing the certification of the electoral count.

At the same time, the President could direct control over communications. That authority would extend to internet service providers, social media platforms, and communications infrastructure. The administration could order providers to restrict services, remove content, or provide user data. It could compel cooperation or threaten penalties for noncompliance. Even partial restrictions, such as slowing networks, limiting platforms, or targeting specific accounts, could disrupt the ability of protest networks to communicate and organize in real time.

The President could also direct the seizure or control of property. These would include seizing facilities used for organizing and taking control of vehicles, equipment, and communications systems.

The same authorities could extend to the financial system. Federal agencies could direct banks and payment networks to freeze accounts associated with organizations or individuals under investigation, restrict access to payment rails, and limit the ability of targeted groups to fund operations or sustain protest activity.

The pressure would extend beyond banks and payment systems. Large employers, logistics firms, and critical infrastructure operators could face directives tied to compliance with federal orders. Companies that rely on federal contracts, licenses, or regulatory approvals would have strong incentives to align with those directives, whether by restricting operations, limiting employee participation in protests, or cooperating with enforcement actions. These pressures would not require universal agreement. Partial compliance by major actors would be sufficient to disrupt organizing capacity and reinforce the effect of federal measures.

These actions could be taken broadly at the outset, before courts rule on their legality, preceding any form of judicial review.

Congress repealed the statutory framework for preventive detention in 1971, replacing it with a prohibition on detention of U.S. citizens absent express statutory authorization. The House sponsor of that repeal, Representative Tom Railsback, stated during floor debate that the prohibition would not extend to situations involving martial law in a true emergency—an acknowledgment of potential limits on Congress’s ability to constrain executive power, though not one written into the statute itself. Courts, for their part, have imposed limits on domestic detention outside the ordinary criminal process.

The question of whether detentions by the Trump administration under PEADs were lawful would be tested immediately in the Courts and Congress. But federal agencies would already be acting. Individuals would already be detained. Communications would already be disrupted. Property would already be under federal control.

A foreign trigger would accelerate this sequence.

The United States is engaged in active conflict with Iran. If an attack occurs on U.S. soil, or a cyber operation affecting election systems is attributed to Iran, the President can incorporate that event into his claims of election fraud. He can assert that foreign adversaries have compromised the election and that domestic protests are amplifying or exploiting that interference.

That framing collapses the distinction between external threat and internal dissent.

The sequence does not depend on the accuracy of his claims. It depends on his authority to act and his willingness to use it.

Countering the Threat

If the risk lies in speed, the counterweight lies in preparation.

Governors can decide now that they will certify results under state law and will not alter or withhold certification in response to federal claims. They can secure custody of ballots and direct state law enforcement to protect election materials. They can prepare for the possibility that federal agents will attempt to seize ballots or voting infrastructure and define in advance how state authorities will respond.

They can also prepare to use their own emergency authorities. Governors control the National Guard in their states unless federalized, and can deploy it to maintain public order, protect election infrastructure, and ensure that state and local officials can carry out their duties. Those duties can include keeping polling places, counting centers, and state facilities open and accessible in the face of disruption. They can coordinate that posture in advance with local law enforcement and, where appropriate, with neighboring states.

Governors also can communicate clearly and early to their constituents that election results will be honored, that certification will proceed under state law, and that the rights of voters will be protected regardless of federal claims to the contrary. That kind of clarity can shape public expectations before a crisis, not after it.

Secretaries of state can harden chain-of-custody procedures, secure physical and digital records, and prepare detailed audit documentation for immediate release. They can pre-position public reporting systems that make results, audits, and underlying data rapidly accessible. Speed matters. Claims of fraud and irregularities take hold quickly; rebuttal must be expeditious.

State attorneys general can draft complaints now, identify jurisdictions for filing, and coordinate multi-state litigation strategies. They can prepare to challenge ballot seizures, interference with certification, emergency detentions, and federal control of election processes. They can also coordinate with local prosecutors and law enforcement to define how state criminal law applies to interference with election administration. Litigation will come in any case. Preparation determines when it begins.

Congress, until January 3, 2027, cannot be expected to function as a constraint on federal overreach. The Republican majority still controls its procedures. Officers such as the House Clerk serve at the chamber’s pleasure and can be replaced. Individual members may resist, but Congress as an institution may not respond to presidential action in the initial phase.

Within the federal government, the choices are likely to be narrow. Officials can preserve institutional norms where possible, refuse clearly unlawful orders where they can, and resign where they cannot. Some may speak publicly. Those decisions will have an impact on how far directives are executed.

The military faces the same constraint. The obligation remains to prevent unlawful domestic use of force where possible. Where that is not possible, the same choices apply.

Community-Based Planning

Outside government, preparation at the community level has already proved its effectiveness.

In Minnesota, community-based networks tracked federal immigration operations in real time, documented arrests and uses of force, and distributed that information rapidly through legal, media, and advocacy channels. That documentation created an immediate factual record, supported litigation, contradicted official accounts, and increased public scrutiny. Federal tactics shifted under that pressure.

The mechanism is straightforward: visibility changes behavior. That model can scale.

Legal organizations can prepare coordinated litigation strategies in advance. Media organizations can establish systems to verify, timestamp, and publish documentation in real time. Civil society networks can build distributed observation systems across jurisdictions, ensuring that federal actions are recorded as they occur rather than reconstructed later.

Technology and communications firms can prepare to challenge federal directives and decide in advance whether they will disclose those directives publicly before complying. Public disclosure can shape the environment in which those directives operate.

Succession Planning

Earlier emergency planning contemplated detention of individuals deemed dangerous during domestic unrest. The statutory framework has changed. The underlying logic has not.

The President has also demonstrated a willingness to target prominent individuals he views as adversaries, including senior law enforcement officials, prosecutors, regulators, and political figures, among others, and to accuse them of criminal conduct. He has also adopted what military planners call decapitation: targeting and removing senior leadership, as in Venezuela and Iran.

That pattern matters. If emergency authorities are invoked, the initial targets may include organizers, elected officials, attorneys general, and institutional leaders. Removing those individuals would immediately weaken coordinated resistance.

Preparation is practical. Officials can establish succession plans. Authority can be distributed across offices and jurisdictions. Civil society organizations can decentralize leadership and build systems that continue to function if key individuals are removed. Legal defense structures can be established in advance.

None of these defensive measures can prevent a President from acting. But they can help determine what happens next.

The executive branch holds the advantage of the first move. It can act quickly and create facts on the ground. Preparing to counter any use of presidential emergency powers to overturn congressional elections narrows that advantage. Preparation shortens the time between action and response and reduces uncertainty about authority.

The first and second Trump administrations have already embarked on massive paramilitary-style deployments of federalized National Guard units and federal agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the FBI, DEA, ATF, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons in largely Democratic-led cities. Targeted urban areas have included Portland, Oregon, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, Chicago, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Charlotte, NC, and Lewiston, ME among others.

Politicians and judges have been arrested, opponents of the administration or those who have merely ruled against Trump’s lawless actions have been subjected to harassment and revenge-fueled prosecution by the Department of Justice. Trump fired Inspectors General (IGs), the independent watchdogs crucial to the provision of government oversight and accountability. He fired immigration judges and reshaped the immigration courts to align with his mass deportation agenda. His Secretary of Defense fired the Judge Advocates General (JAGs), eliminating key roadblocks to illegal presidential orders.

Nothing in the record suggests this President will be constrained by law, precedent, custom, norms or the Constitution from invoking the unchecked authority conveyed in the Presidential Emergency Action Documents to overturn adverse election results and squash domestic resistance to the consolidation of his power.

Emergency planning of the kind described in this article is not prediction. It is deciding, in advance, how this nation will respond when it is tested.

Jonathan M. Winer, a former senior State Department official, is a member of The Steady State. The Steady State is a nonpartisan organization of more than 280 former senior national security professionals from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security which advocates for constitutional democracy, the rule of law and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.

https://washingtonspectator.org/emergency-planning-the-president-is-preparing-to-challenge-2026-midterms-the-country-can-still-act-to-protect-them/